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Abstract 
Recently, the oil and gas prices globally are down in the world. The price of energy partly depends on economic recession in 
People Republic of China (precisely China). It is an macro economical circumstance. In this study, with taking to consider the 
seventeen years period, it is trying to find an answer to: if China independently or in coordination with another super economies- 
Japan and South Korea (precisely Korea) can be overcome with energy safety and can be an important part of the oil and gas 
bargaining in Eurasian (Central (Middle) Asia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia) oil and gas markets with taking a stand against the 
other superpowers which are also the big players of the energy market in the world. Today the problem is about recession – and 
decreasing energy demands. But on the next years the problem will be as an increased energy costs in boom cycle period of 
economies. The energy investments are crucial for economic growth. In this study, it is focused on, geographical closeness, 
which is so important for energy investments. Because of this, Eurasian energy resources are more important for China, Japan 
and Korea.   
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1. Introduction 
The study is about the collaboration efficiencies of energy cooperation between China, Japan and Korea. All of 
these countries are three of the big developed countries. Also, because of this, their energy consumptions in industry 
and in households’ environment are larger than the developing countries. All these three countries have a large 
importation energies from the big petroleum (crude and derivatives) and natural gas exporters in the World. China 
Japan and Korea are the neighbors in the same geographic part: East Asia. Especially, China has also owned a rapid 
economic growth for at least twenty years. Calder (2005) and Katz (2013) summarized the contemporary trade 
relationships between China and Japan. Zweig & Jianhai (2005) explain the awareness of Chinese bureaucracies of 
the importance of agreements of China, Japan, and Korea on the crucial role of geography for safe energy 
transportation to North East Asia. Also, Liao (2007), has considered the historical experiences could make possible 
of energy cooperation between China and Japan. On the contrary that, Hu & Ge (2014) has pointed to Russian 
clashes with EU would make intensify of the North East Asian market especially between China and Japan.   
Sustainability of this economic growth is depending on energy safety which is an important factor in income growth. 
China, Japan and Korea are giving importance to make easy to obtain cheaper energy and to make safe energy trade 
lines (whether by pipelines or by maritime transports).  For two decades and a half the new oil and gas fields in 
Russia, Caucasus, and Middle Asia (precisely Eurasia) have been new alternative energy resources in the world. 
China and other developed countries -European Union (EU), USA and India- have contended with each other on oil 
and gas concession and distributing arrangements by their companies in the Middle Asia (Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan) and Azerbaijan. Although China has geographical advantages in this contest, she was late to invest 
directly in energy industry in the Middle Asia. Asian, European, American and Russian companies have important 
part of the large energy consortiums in Eurasian reservoirs, which are in operation. However, China and Russia have 
led an outstanding economic institution, namely “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SOC) since April 1996. 
This cooperation has provided energy agreements and linkages between the China and some former Soviet Union 
countries Kazakhstan, Russian and Uzbekistan (three founder members of SOC) which are the active (or potential) 
oil and gas exporters. China has developed energy trading and investment relations with especially Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekstan, even with Iran (an Observer State of SOC) and Turkmenistan (a Guest Attendance State of SOC) 
(Christensen 2011). 
Japan is one of the most important economies in the world and she is not far from the Eurasian energy fields which 
are mentioned above. But there is a sea “Japan sea” between the Japan and Russia-China where are near and owner 
of the energy fields. Even though Japan is trying to decrease her dependency to foreign energy sources because of a 
planning to make less carbon emission for her ecology, needs energy more for economic sustainability. Japan did 
not make significant relationships with Eurasian countries in energy case. But the EU and other developed countries 
(especially China) which have invested to alternative oil and gas resources in Eurasia. These energy fields are the 
new discovered oil and gas reservoirs rather than Gulf countries’. Euroasian reservoirs are nearer than the North 
African and American reservoirs to the China, Japan and Korea. Therefore all the three of them need to these 
Eurasian resources. Their challenges with other developed countries on oil and gas energy is inevitable in these 
circumstances (Jisi 2005 ). 
2. Methodology 
The study is about the efficiencies of energy collaboration possibilities for China, Japan and South Korea by 
opposite to other big oil and gas importer economies in the World. These possible opposite (rivalry) economies on 
energy importation are European Union (27 Countries), USA, and India. The strategic oil and natural gas regions 
concerned in the study are on the Asia, which are Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. The 
period which is interested in, is interim of 1995-2012. The framework of the study is based on Two Player Zero Sum 
Game Theory Analysis ሺƬͳͻͺ͸ǢǤǤͳͻͺ͹ሻ. 
The analysis is taken on in three parts.  
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In the first part of the analysis, the efficiencies of the strategies of China individually (as a first player in the game 
theory analysis), to the other ones of the competitor countries (second player of the game theory analysis) are 
estimated. Japan and Korea is taken as an second player like EU, India, and USA.  
The second part of the analysis is about that, when China and Japan are collaborated for energy safety, “will it give 
these both of  two countries any advantage towards the other big energy importers”.  
The third part of the analysis is about that, when China, Japan and Korea come together to collaborate for energy 
resources against the others, “will it give them a good condition for energy bargaining in front of the others”. 
First, for every import countries from the exporters it has been calculated that, the arithmetic means of the 1995-
2012 period from the sums of petroleum and natural gas imports values in thousands US Dollar. 
The analysis is limited with petroleum and natural gas imports of the related import countries. 
3. Data and Formulation 
The data have been supported from the UNCTAD Stat web page, 
“http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx”. In this web page from the “Folder” it has been 
opened that “International Trade in Goods and Services-Trade Structure by Partner, Product” file, signed 
“Merchandise trade matrix - product groups, imports in thousands of dollars, annual, 1995-2012,“ button; after 
then selected  the “Product” as “Petroleum, and Petroleum Products and Related Materials” and “Gas Natural and 
Manufactured”  then selected the “Economy” (importers): China, Japan, S. Korea, EU (27), India, and USA, and 
selected the “Partner” (exporters): Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.  
To measure the efficiencies of energy of the first player -like China, or China and Japan together, or China, Japan 
and Korea- altogether in the game theory, towards the other big importers –EU, India and USA, firstly, the concept 
of the strategies must be decided.  
The formulation of the game strategies is based on the oil and gas imports of the first and second players from the 
exporters -like Eurasian countries: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan in a game matrix. These 
exporters are also the strategies for game partners.  
For Example, Kazakhstan strategy of China (as a first player) to Iran strategy of EU (as a second player) is seen as a 
result of net earnings of the first player -China, shown in a boxed cell which is valued in “-7.206.701” in Table .1. 
Table 1. Sample of A Game Matrix  (average values of between the 1995-2012 period in $US thousands.) 
      
EU 
  
   Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 
   Azerbaijan Iran Kazakhstan Russia Turkmenistan 
 Strategy 1 Azerbaijan -5.887.627 -9.151.439 -9.807.501 -67.960.940 -157.879 
 Strategy 2 Iran 652.320 -2.611.492 -3.267.553 -61.420.992 6.382.068 
China Strategy 3 Kazakhstan -3.942.889 -7.206.701 -7.862.763 -66.016.202 1.786.858 
 Strategy 4 Russia -1.098.432 -4.362.244 -5.018.306 -63.171.745 4.631.315 
 Strategy 5 Turkmenistan -5.136.388 -8.400.200 -9.056.262 -67.209.701 593.360 
For a net oil and gas imports (earnings) of the first player can be calculated with taking consider the example above 
like that:  
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KZK
IRN KZK IRN
CHN
EU CHN EUNM M M                        (1) 
 KZK
IRN
CHN
EUNM , Chinese net imports of oil and gas from Kazakhstan, relative to EU’s imports of oil and gas from Iran. 
 
KZKCHN
M , Chinese total imports of oil and gas from Kazakhstan. 
 
IRNEU
M , EU’s total imports of oil and gas from Iran. 
Negative values of net imports like in the sample above ($-7.206.701) means that, (
KZK IRNCHN EU
M M ) 
there is a loss of strategy of China against the EU’s strategy. In a game matrix if there is a more negatives of values. 
It is a disadvantage for the first player in the strategic game. If there is more positive values in game matrix, it is an 
advantage for  first player to second player in strategical effectiveness in energy market.   
Every game matrix is formed between two countries (players). Every game matrix of the two players (importers) is 
in '5×5' form. 
In the study, as they are signed above there are six player countries: China, Japan, EU, India, Korea, and USA. In 
the light of the aim of the study, it is pointed before. At first there is two- player strategy of China with other five 
countries- which means there are five matrixes. At second if China will collaborate with Japan about the Eurasian 
energy there will be competition with other four importer countries –like EU, India, Korea, and USA. That means, 
need four matrixes.  At third if China, Japan and Korea are coming together for the same energy resources their 
second player partners will be three second player partners –like EU, India, and USA. It means need three matrixes.  
At the total of the analysis it will be need twelve game matrixes in total. 
This concept of the strategy may be looks like unacceptable logically that, one can say that in the economics and 
finance the minimizing the imports of energy is a cost advantage for the growing of a nation. It is true. But here, the 
amount of the energy imports is considered as a market power of superpowers in the world. Especially in recent 
times, because of the world recessions or transition to “New Normal” economy has changed the energy markets 
from oligopoly to oligopsony. In this case, the energy importations of developed countries can be a measurement of 
bargaining power. In this study, importation extend is not used as an target but as a proxy means to the market 
power in energy trade (Bozdağ & Saraçoğlu 2013). 
4. Basic Findings 
The five results of the first part of the game theory analysis are estimated by the zero sum game theory matrix with 
WinQSB 2.0 pocket program : 
1. Strategies for China as a first player, is not the winner against strategies for Japan. 
2. Strategies for China as a first player, is the winner against strategies for Korea. 
3. Strategies for China as a first player, is not the winner against strategies for EU. 
4. Strategies for China as a first player, is the winner against strategies for India. 
5. Strategies for China as a first player, is the winner against strategies for USA. 
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When looking at the average in the period of 17 years, Chinese oil and gas purchasing power strategies are not 
useful against the Japan and EU. But on the other hand Chinese strategies are useful against Korea, India, and USA. 
The results of the second part of the analysis is about that, if China makes an agreement with Japan to move on 
together about energy demand, will China reverse the disadvantage to an advantage against the EU. As it is pointed 
in the first analysis China has advantages of energy bargaining power against the Korea, India and USA. But if 
China joined with Japan , she can eliminate the disadvantage to the others. But in the second analysis: 
6. Strategies for China and Japan both of them as a first player, is still not the winner against strategies for 
EU. 
It is not necessary to analyse the China-Japan advantages to the other second players, Korea, India and USA. 
Logically, Chinese and Japanese collaboration strategy is the winner against strategies for these countries. 
The sample formulation of the Japan and China collaboration strategy can be rewritten from the equation 1 is that: 
 ( )KZKIRN KZK KZK IRNCHN JPNEU CHN JPN EUNM M M M                                 (2) 
As a third analysis of the collaboration of three pacific developed countries China, Japan and Korea on energy 
trading gives the same result in the second analysis against the EU strategies, means that: 
7. Strategies for China, Japan, and Korea all of them as a first player, is still not the winner against strategies 
for EU. 
The sample formulation of the cooperation that China, Japan, and Korea come together cross the other big importers 
like EU.     
 ( )KZKIRN KZK KZK KZK IRNCHN JPN KOREU CHN JPN KOR EUNM M M M M                             (3) 
 
As a result, EU is absolutely winner in energy trade from Eurasian resources toward China, Japan, and Korea. In 
seventeen years, EU is the customer who has bought the biggest amount of oil and gas from Russia. Russia has 
already been  the biggest resource of Eurasian energy suppliers nowadays. 
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5. Conclusion 
The study shows that China is one of the biggest customers for Eurasian suppliers. And as a single, she is the winner 
of the strategies for the Eurasian oil and gas market against India and Korea and USA. China will not require 
collaboration with Japan. But Japan is a competitor against the China, and has surprised with her strategic advantage 
to China in this case. Therefore China will be eliminating this negation by collaborating with Japan on increasing 
the market shares. To taking an agreement on common interests, like energy availability, safety and modest price 
quotation guarantees are more important issues for China and Japan.  Both them  are in the same physical and 
economic geographies in Pacific.  
China, Japan, and Korea can collaborate for joined energy trade policy even if three of them are not efficiency 
against the EU. Because, the Russians new interests clashes with EU’s interests, and the new ways of all parts are 
changed on energy market policies.  
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